Swanda v. Menard

Background

On August 2, 2020, Linda Swanda and her partner Barbara Bougie visited a Menard store in St. Paul, Minnesota, to shop for outdoor chairs. Swanda sat in a display model — the Backyard Creations Leona Swivel Chair (the "Leona chair"), designed by Z Outdoor Living, LLC (ZOL) — and the chair collapsed, throwing her backward onto the ground. She got up in significant pain. Swanda testified she knew nothing about whether the chair was assembled correctly or whether it was defectively designed, and that specific chair no longer exists.

Bougie, standing nearby, observed that the top of the chair had separated from its base and noticed a large bolt on the floor next to the chair. She stated that a Menard employee indicated he would try to reinsert the bolt, but a manager directed him not to and to remove the chair instead. Bougie later qualified that she was not certain whether the employee carried the chair away in two pieces. Surveillance video captured Swanda approaching and examining the chair but did not capture the actual fall; by the time the camera angle shifted back, the incident had already occurred.

Swanda filed suit in Minnesota state court on July 16, 2024, alleging Menard was negligent in assembling the chair and that ZOL and AMG International, LLC (AMG) — described as the chair's designer and manufacturer, respectively — were strictly liable for displaying a defective and dangerous chair. Menard removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)).

Additionally, on August 31, 2024, after initiating this lawsuit, Swanda filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy (a form of personal bankruptcy that discharges most debts). In her bankruptcy petition, she stated she had no claims against third parties and was not a party to any civil lawsuit — omitting this case entirely. The bankruptcy was discharged on December 3, 2024. At her March 2025 deposition, Swanda acknowledged she had not disclosed this lawsuit in her bankruptcy filing. On the same day defendants moved for summary judgment (December 10, 2025), Swanda moved to reopen her bankruptcy case to disclose the personal injury claim as an asset.

All three defendants moved for summary judgment on December 10, 2025, arguing both (1) that judicial estoppel — a doctrine barring a party from taking a position in litigation that contradicts a position taken in prior proceedings — precluded Swanda's claims because she concealed them in bankruptcy, and (2) that Swanda could not produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact on the merits.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Swanda) and does not weigh evidence or assess credibility at this stage. Because jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the court applies Minnesota substantive law.

Claims Against Menard

Negligence

To establish negligence under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must show: (1) a duty of care existed; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff was injured; and (4) the breach proximately caused the injury. The court identified Menard's duty as the obligation to assemble and display a safe chair.

The court also addressed Swanda's attempt to use evidence from Peter D. Hill, whom she labeled ZOL's "expert." The court found three problems: Hill was not ZOL's expert but its former Chief Financial Officer; the document was an email about a different incident involving a different chair in Indiana; and the email actually stated that even improper assembly would make the relevant chair "hard to tip" and that issues were "not likely" — the opposite of what Swanda claimed it said.

The court rejected this argument primarily on the "exclusive control" element. Once the Leona chair was placed on the sales floor for display, it was accessible to any number of shoppers and was no longer under Menard's exclusive control. The court also noted that falling over in a chair can happen without any negligence, undermining the first element as well.

Products Liability

Swanda alleged Menard was strictly liable for displaying a defective and dangerous chair. Under Minnesota law, a products liability claim requires showing: (1) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed when the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.

The court found Swanda's products liability claim failed for essentially the same reasons as her negligence claim. She could not show the alleged defect — a loose or dislodged screw — existed when the chair left Menard's control, as opposed to developing afterward from customer handling. Her expert acknowledged there was no evidence of a manufacturer's defect. And her causation evidence was insufficient for the same reasons discussed under negligence.

The court granted summary judgment to Menard on both the negligence and products liability claims.

Claims Against ZOL and AMG

Swanda alleged ZOL and AMG were strictly liable as the chair's designer and manufacturer for displaying a defective and dangerous chair. ZOL and AMG argued in their summary-judgment briefing that Swanda produced no evidence of a design defect or manufacturing defect. Swanda's response brief made no argument about ZOL's or AMG's liability for design or manufacturing defects. The court held that this complete failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constituted forfeiture (waiver) of those claims under Eighth Circuit precedent.

The court also addressed, in a footnote, a failure-to-warn theory that ZOL and AMG had briefed but that Swanda had not actually alleged in her complaint. Even assuming such a claim had been properly raised, the court found it would fail because Swanda put forth no evidence that ZOL and AMG manufactured a dangerous product — a prerequisite for a duty to warn.

The court granted summary judgment to ZOL and AMG.

Judicial Estoppel

Because the court granted summary judgment on the merits to all defendants, it declined to reach the judicial estoppel argument. In a footnote, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the judicial estoppel doctrine in the bankruptcy context in Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., 608 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that courts should consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether a bankruptcy omission was inadvertent, rather than focusing narrowly on whether the debtor had knowledge and motive to conceal.

Disposition

The court granted Menard's motion for summary judgment, granted ZOL's and AMG's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Swanda's complaint with prejudice.