F.M. v. Blanche

Background

Petitioner Sergio F.M. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a legal request asking a court to order the government to release someone from detention — challenging his immigration detention following an arrest on May 20 (year not specified in the opinion). Respondents are the Acting Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Acting Director of ICE's St. Paul Field Office.

Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz issued a Report and Recommendation on June 15, 2026, recommending that the petition be granted and Sergio F.M. released. Judge Schultz concluded that (1) the administrative arrest warrant submitted by the government did not provide a lawful basis for the arrest, and (2) the warrantless arrest did not comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), the statute authorizing warrantless immigration arrests under specific conditions. The government filed objections, triggering de novo (fresh, independent) review by Chief Judge Tostrud under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Government's Three Objections and the Court's Rulings

Objection 1: Removal Order Divests the Court of Jurisdiction

The government argued that a final order of removal issued by an immigration judge on June 16, 2026 — the day after the Report and Recommendation — eliminated the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction (legal authority to hear the case) to order Sergio's release. The government cited 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), which provides that a petition for review filed with a court of appeals is the exclusive means for judicial review of a removal order.

The court rejected this argument. Sergio does not challenge the removal order; he challenges the legality of his May 20 arrest and detention. The removal order did not exist when the petition was filed, and Sergio did not seek to stay or contest the removal proceedings. The court held that the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(5) does not apply to a challenge directed solely at the lawfulness of the initial detention.

Objection 2: 8 U.S.C. § 1231 Independently Justified the Arrest

The government argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A) — which mandates detention of noncitizens during the removal period — independently authorized Sergio's warrantless arrest on May 20.

The court disagreed. While § 1231 may require mandatory detention, ICE still needed valid statutory authority to effectuate the arrest in the first place. The court cited sister-court decisions from this district holding that ICE has no authority to act absent congressional authorization. Additionally, the governing regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 241.3(a) specifically requires that noncitizens subject to a final removal order be taken into custody pursuant to a warrant of removal — meaning the warrant must precede the arrest.

The record showed that the warrant here was issued after the arrest, not before it. Deportation Officer Geneva A. Balencia attested that the Form I-200 (the arrest warrant form) was based on information gathered from immigration officers, Sergio himself, and law enforcement sources. The warrant's probable-cause determination relied on Sergio's voluntary statements to an immigration officer and biometric data — information that could only have been collected after Sergio was already in custody. The court therefore concluded that the warrant was not a valid pre-arrest authorization.

Objection 3: Proper Warrantless Arrest Procedures Were Followed

The government argued, in the alternative, that even if the arrest was warrantless, it complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). A lawful warrantless immigration arrest under that statute requires (1) probable cause to believe the person violated immigration law, and (2) reason to believe the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.

Judge Schultz had already agreed with the government that the first requirement was satisfied — that officers had reason to believe Sergio was in the country in violation of immigration laws. The only dispute was whether the government showed Sergio was likely to flee before a warrant could be issued.

The government's sole argument on this point was that Sergio's multi-year overstay of a visa showed he would likely escape. The court agreed with Judge Schultz and with other judges in this district who have previously rejected that argument as legally insufficient, and overruled this objection as well.

Disposition

Chief Judge Tostrud overruled all three of the government's objections, accepted the Report and Recommendation, and granted Sergio F.M.'s habeas petition. The court ordered the government to release Sergio F.M. from custody within the State of Minnesota at a time and place to be communicated to his counsel, and to return any of his property in the government's possession. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.