Gipson v. Boston Scientific Scimed Inc.

Background

Isis Gipson, representing herself without a lawyer (pro se), sued her former employer, Boston Scientific Scimed Inc., over events that occurred during her employment from July 2023 to September 2023. She alleged that male coworkers subjected her to daily vulgar verbal sexual harassment beginning two weeks into her employment, that coworkers made statements about her mental state and hygiene, that her work was intensely scrutinized, and that coworkers treated her as though she had a mental health impairment. She also alleged that Boston Scientific required her to install device-management software (Microsoft Intune MDM) on her personal phone and that coworkers made real-time comments about her private routine suggesting unauthorized access to her phone. She reported the harassment and privacy concerns to Human Resources but claims no action was taken. She resigned in September 2023, alleging the conditions were so intolerable she had no other option (a legal theory called "constructive discharge").

Gipson filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint on June 11, 2024, and received a right-to-sue notice the following day, June 12, 2024. This lawsuit — her fourth — was filed on July 28, 2025. Her prior three lawsuits were dismissed: the first for naming only coworkers rather than her employer; the second (against the EEOC itself) for the same reason; and the third for untimeliness.

Claims and Rulings

Gipson's amended complaint asserted eighteen counts, which the court grouped into five categories.

Employment Discrimination and Retaliation (Counts I–V and part of III)

Counts I, II, IV, and V alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Title VII and the ADA require a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the unlawful practice and to file suit within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue notice. The MHRA requires filing within one year of the discriminatory practice. Gipson's current suit was filed in July 2025 — almost two years after the 2023 conduct and over a year after her June 2024 right-to-sue notice — making these claims untimely. The court held that earlier complaints in separate lawsuits do not carry over to toll (pause) the deadline in a new, independent lawsuit under the relation-back doctrine (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)).

The court also rejected equitable tolling (a doctrine allowing deadlines to be extended in exceptional circumstances). It found that being self-represented is not sufficiently extraordinary to justify tolling, and that Gipson did not explain how emotional distress prevented her from filing against the correct defendant, especially since she had managed to file against other defendants during the same period. Counts I, II, IV, V, and part of Count III were dismissed as time-barred.

Count III also included a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA). The court found this claim preempted by the MHRA — meaning the MHRA, as the exclusive remedy for workplace discrimination at the time of the conduct, displaced the MWA claim — because both were based on the same underlying conduct. Additionally, the court found the MWA claim substantively deficient because the MWA protects employees who report violations affecting people beyond themselves, and Gipson's reported violations only affected her. The remainder of Count III was dismissed.

Privacy, Surveillance, and Data Misuse (Counts VI–IX)

Count VI alleged invasion of privacy. Minnesota recognizes three invasion-of-privacy torts: intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, and publication of private facts. The court analyzed this as an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim. It found Gipson's allegations — that coworkers made comments about her private routines — too speculative to plausibly explain how coworkers accessed information the software did not share with Boston Scientific employees. Count VI was dismissed.

Count VII alleged violation of Minnesota's data-breach-notification statute (Minn. Stat. § 325E.61). The court noted that this statute provides no private right of action (only the state attorney general can enforce it), and Gipson conceded the claim. Count VII was dismissed.

Count VIII alleged a civil claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), a federal law criminalizing unauthorized computer access. Civil CFAA claims are available only in limited circumstances (e.g., losses over $5,000, physical injury, public health threats), none of which Gipson alleged. The court also found the underlying allegations of device access too speculative. Count VIII was dismissed.

Count IX alleged violation of the federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511), which prohibits intentional interception of electronic communications. The court found the complaint failed to provide sufficient detail — the how, what, when, where, or why of any alleged interception. Count IX was dismissed.

Defamation and Emotional Distress (Counts X–XI)

Count X alleged defamation. Minnesota law requires defamation to be pled with specificity, including identification of particular false statements. Gipson identified only general topics of statements without specifying any actual statement made. She also conceded the claim's insufficiency. Count X was dismissed.

Count XI alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The court found this claim preempted by the MHRA for the same reasons as the MWA claim. The court also found the claim substantively deficient because Minnesota law requires conduct that is "extreme and outrageous" — so atrocious it is utterly intolerable to the civilized community — and the alleged conduct (surveillance, retaliation, isolation) did not meet that standard. Count XI was dismissed.

Constitutional Claims (Counts XII–XV)

Counts XII through XV alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a federal law allowing suits against government officials for civil rights violations). The court explained that constitutional protections and § 1983 claims apply only against government (state) actors, not private companies. Boston Scientific is a private company, not a government entity. Gipson's complaint alleged that individuals acted "in coordination with state actors," but offered no factual explanation of any such connection. Gipson conceded these claims. Counts XII through XV were dismissed.

Conspiracy and Breach of Duty (Counts XVI–XVIII)

Count XVI alleged spoliation of evidence (failure to preserve evidence) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e). The court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create independent causes of action. Gipson conceded this. To the extent Gipson sought sanctions under Rule 37(e), the court found the request premature — no finding had been made that Boston Scientific failed to preserve relevant evidence. Count XVI was dismissed; the sanctions request was denied as premature.

Count XVII alleged breach of implied employment contract — specifically implied duties of confidentiality, fair treatment, and nondiscrimination. The court found this preempted by the MHRA's exclusive-remedy provision as applied to discrimination-related duties, and separately found the claim failed because there were no facts suggesting Boston Scientific understood or agreed to any implied contractual duties. Gipson conceded factual deficiency. Count XVII was dismissed.

Count XVIII alleged failure to prevent a conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. That statute carries a one-year statute of limitations. Because Gipson filed the current suit in July 2025, almost two years after the alleged violations ended in September 2023, the claim was time-barred. Count XVIII was dismissed.

Dismissal With Prejudice

The court dismissed all eighteen counts with prejudice, meaning Gipson cannot refile these claims. Time-barred claims were dismissed with prejudice because refiling would not cure the untimeliness. Conceded claims were dismissed with prejudice because the court — already reading the complaint broadly given Gipson's pro se status — found that amendment to reframe the same facts under new legal theories would be futile. For the substantively deficient claims, the court found further amendment unwarranted because this was Gipson's fourth lawsuit and fifth complaint arising from the same events, and persistent failures to plead adequately counseled against allowing further amendment.

Order

Boston Scientific's motion to dismiss was granted. Gipson's amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.